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Summary
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes 
three approaches for countries to cooperate 
with each other: cooperative approaches under 
Art. 6.2, a new mechanism to promote mitiga­
tion and sustainable development under Art.
6.4, and a framework for non-market approach­
es under Art. 6.8. Detailed rules for these three 
approaches are currently being negotiated. 
This paper summarises the views submitted by 
Parties in October 2017 to identify points of 
controversy and convergence. It builds on a 
previous papers which summarised views sub­
mitted in September 2016 and March 2017.
Raising Ambition and Promoting Environ­
mental Integrity 
While the Paris Agreement mandates that Art. 6 
should contribute to increasing climate ambi­
tion and promote environmental integrity, 
many submissions do not discuss these issues 
in detail. Those that do exhibit a wide diver­
gence of views, with calls for ambitious action 
on the one hand and calls to have only mini­
mum requirements on the other.
The African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the EU 
and New Zealand put it into the context of en­
vironmental integrity.  
The AGN considers it imperative that coopera­
tive approaches result in an increase of ambi­
tion. Mitigation outcomes can in their view only 
be traded if the cooperation has resulted in a 
greater level of mitigation than would have oc­
curred in the absence of the cooperation. Par­
ties involved must in their view demonstrate 
how they safeguard environmental integrity 
and sustainable development; this reporting 
would be subject to expert review, and Parties 
would only be allowed to use ITMOs towards 
their NDCs in case of positive expert reviews.  
Canada similarly suggests that environmental 
integrity means that the generation and use of 
ITMOs must reduce overall global emissions.
The EU and New Zealand posit that environ­
mental integrity needs to be related to the 
Agreement’s more general principles, in partic­
ular the long-term goal, the progression of
NDCs over time, and the requirements that 
NDCs should reflect the highest possible ambi­
tion and move over time towards economy­
wide emission reductions. New Zealand further 
specifies that long crediting periods or credit­
ing against BAU are not compatible with the 
Agreement’s requirements. 
The Arab Group and the LMDCs have a diamet­
rically opposite position. They declare that the 
special character of Art. 6.2 lies not in the pro­
duction of mitigation outcomes, which is also 
addressed in other parts of the Agreement, but 
rather in their transfer. For this reason, envi­
ronmental integrity should in their view be re­
lated to the transfer of mitigation outcomes 
while the mitigation outcomes themselves are 
the prerogative of Parties.
Thailand similarly wants to establish only mini­
mum criteria on environmental integrity. No 
discount or exchange rates or similar ap­
proaches should be introduced.
Promoting Sustainable Development 
The submissions that are so far available seem
to indicate that the controversy on whether or 
not to have international provisions on sustain­
able development may be over. Most submis­
sions that discuss sustainable development 
agree that the definition of sustainable devel­
opment and the determination whether activi­
ties contribute to sustainable development is a 























Update on Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
submissions suggest that Parties should be re­
quired to report on how their use of Article 6 is
promoting sustainable development. The EU is
the most specific on this issue, suggesting 
comparable reporting on the basis of the Sus­
tainable Development Goals. A number of 
submissions also suggest that an international
tool like the CDM sustainable development tool
could be helpful to assess activities in a compa­
rable manner, with use on a voluntary basis.
The EU and Tuvalu also discuss human rights in
this context. The EU suggests that host Parties 
should confirm that activities are in conformity 
with their respective obligations on human 
rights, while Tuvalu proposes that all units trad­
ed under Articles 6.2 and 6.4 would need to in­
clude a certificate indicating that the units trad­
ed or received have not resulted in 
environmental harm and have not adversely af­
fected any human rights. 
Accounting Emissions
Many submissions call for regular ongoing re­
porting and accounting to take place in the 
context of the broader accounting under Article 
4.13 and the transparency framework under Ar­
ticle 13.
Most submissions maintain that Article 6 should 
have an inclusive approach, allowing participa­
tion of all countries irrespective of the types of 
their NDCs. However, Tuvalu posits that only 
Parties to the Paris Agreement that have quan­
tified their NDCs should be eligible to trade 
emissions under Article 6.2 and to host activi­
ties under Article 6.4. 
There is controversy on whether there is a need 
for corresponding adjustments if mitigation ac­
tions take place outside the host country’s NDC 
boundary. Japan stipulates that the Art. 6.2 
guidance should ensure incentives for Parties to 
increase the coverage of sectors under their 
NDCs. They therefore suggest that irrespective 
of whether credits are transferred or generated 
inside or outside a Party’s NDC coverage, they 
should in both cases be added to its emissions 
or deducted from its removals. By contrast, the 
AGN holds that corresponding adjustments 
would not apply if emission reductions are out­
side the scope of the transferring country’s
NDC, or if units are cancelled instead of being 
used for NDC compliance. In their view, the 
main reason why a sector is not included in an 
NDC is usually lack of quality data. Instead of 
penalising such sectors, Article 6 should in their 
view be used to improve data availability and
thereby prepare integration in future NDCs.
Brazil continues to maintain the view that cor­
responding adjustment is only applicable in the 
context of Art. 6.2 and in the case of one Party 
transferring acquired Art. 6.4 units to another 
Party, but not to the initial forwarding from the
Art. 6.4 registry to the 6.2 multilateral registry.  
Scope and Governance of Cooperative Ap­
proaches 
Consensus on what cooperative approaches are 
continues to be elusive. Many submissions hold 
that cooperative approaches should include 
any kind of cooperation between two or more 
countries. By contrast, Brazil’s submission is not 
explicit on the issue, but the table of contents it
proposes for the Art. 6.2 guidance suggests that 
it continues to see Art. 6.2 as analogous to Art.
17 of the Kyoto Protocol. The AGN similarly 
suggests that cooperation could take many 
shapes, but ITMOs are in their view a bookkeep­
ing unit reflecting the net balance of trades and 
do not constitute carbon credits or a type of 
commodity. They posit that ITMOs are neither 
issued, nor can they be held, traded, cancelled,
banked, or be used by private entities to fulfil
commitments. Tuvalu similarly holds that use of
cooperative approaches should be limited to 
trading emission reductions that are in excess 
of a Party’s NDC. Units can in their view not be
sold to other Parties after the first transaction, 
nor be traded in secondary markets.
Most of the submissions that are available so far 
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What Types of Activities under the Art. 6.4 
Mechanism?
In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris 
Agreement does not specify that the new “sus­
tainable development mechanism” is about 
“projects”, raising the question of the level of 
aggregation of activities (projects, programmes 
and/or sectors). Most submissions suggest that 
the new mechanism should include all types of 
mitigation activities at all scales. By contrast, 
Brazil continues to maintain the view that the 
new mechanism should be similar to the CDM.
The AGN and New Zealand suggest staging the 
development of regulations for different types 
of activities. New Zealand proposes starting 
with project-based activities based on existing 
experience and then moving to other types.
Overall Mitigation of Global Emissions
While the Paris Agreement foresees that the 
new mechanism shall contribute to an overall 
mitigation of global emissions, only a few sub­
missions discuss how to operationalise this ob­
jective. New Zealand notes that a definition of 
overall mitigation is so far lacking and suggests 
it should mean that not all the mitigation out­
comes achieved by an activity are credited to 
the activity.
The EU, Japan and New Zealand consider that 
the concept needs to be reflected in accounting 
rules and methodologies, with Japan and New 
Zealand suggesting conservative baselines. By 
contrast, Brazil claims that the additionality re­
quirement ensures that emissions are tackled at 
a level that goes beyond what would be 
achieved through the delivery of the host Par-
ty's and the acquiring Party's NDCs in aggre­
gate.
Transition from the CDM 
There is a controversy on whether to prioritise 
discussions on transition from the CDM. In par­
ticular the AGN and Brazil see this as a matter of 
urgency in order not to waste the mitigation 
potential of existing projects and to protect the 
credibility of international mechanisms. The Ar-
ab Group and Brazil also call for the transposi­
tion of rules, methodologies, infrastructure and 
accreditation. 
By contrast, the EU, Japan and New Zealand are 
against easy transposition of regulations and 
activities. The EU and New Zealand maintain 
that CDM activities would need to be re­
assessed against the new mechanisms regula­
tions prior to adoption into the mechanism. 
Non-Market Approaches 
The submissions on non-market approaches do 
not indicate substantial conceptual advances.
The Like-Minded Developing Countries reiter­
ate their suggestion that the framework should 
facilitate access to finance, technology transfer, 
and capacity building for mitigation and adap­
tation, and contributing to map and register 
needs of countries and assisting them in match­
ing them with means of implementation.
Other countries reiterate their concern to avoid 
duplication of work with other processes under 
the UNFCCC. They suggest to focus discussions 
on possible synergies and coordination in non­
market cooperation.
New Zealand suggests a novel idea for how to 
move forward. They propose to relocate the 
Technical Examination Process (TEP) and Tech­
nical Expert Meetings (TEMs) into the Article 6.8 
work programme. They argue that the TEP and 
TEMs are established processes for considering 
policy approaches that fit well with the purpos­
es of Article 6.8. In this way, Parties could coop­
erate on ambition, maintain an existing space 
where ideas and relationships are built, and ex­
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1 Introduction
 
Art. 6.1 of the Paris Agreement recognizes “that 
some Parties choose to pursue voluntary coop­
eration in the implementation of their national­
ly determined contributions to allow for higher 
ambition in their mitigation and adaptation ac­
tions and to promote sustainable development 
and environmental integrity.” 
Art. 6 subsequently establishes three ap­
proaches for countries to cooperate with each 
other:
•	 First, Art. 6.2 and 6.3 provides the op­
tion for Parties to directly engage in 
“cooperative approaches” and to use 
“internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes” in achieving their NDCs. In­
ternational supervision of these coop­
erative activities is not foreseen, but a 
work programme was agreed to devel­
op guidance for Parties that want to 
engage in cooperative approaches.
•	 Second, Art. 6.4-6.7 establishes a new 
mechanism “to contribute to the miti­
gation of greenhouse gas emissions 
and support sustainable development”,
referred to by many as “sustainable de­
velopment mechanism”. In contrast to
the cooperative approaches, this mech­
anism will be supervised by a body 
mandated by the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement. In addition, the Parties are 
to adopt rules, modalities and proce­
dures which must be observed when 
implementing activities under Article 
6.4.
•	 Third, Art. 6.8 and 6.9 provides for the 
use of non-market approaches. Just 
how these approaches are to work will 
be determined in the coming years with 
 
the development of a “framework for 
non-market approaches”. 
The task of developing the guidance for coop­
erative approaches, the rules, modalities and 
procedures for the new mechanism, and the 
framework for non-market approaches was 
mandated to the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).
SBSTA has conducted discussions at various 
sessions and invited three rounds of submis­
sions of views. This paper summarises the views 
submitted in the third round in October 2017 to 
identify points of controversy and convergence.
It builds on two previous papers which summa­
rised the views submitted in September 2016 
and March 2017.1 
The paper will first synthesise the views on
cross-cutting issues and subsequently move to 
the three individual approaches under Art. 6.
 
1 Obergassel, Wolfgang (2016): Shaping the Paris Mecha­
nisms - A Summary of Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement. Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institute for Climate,
Environment and Energy. www.carbon­
mechanisms.de/en/2016/shaping-the-paris-mechanisms/
Obergassel, Wolfgang (2017): Shaping the Paris Mecha­
nisms Part II - An Update on Submissions on Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement. Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institute for 































All three Art. 6 approaches need to adhere to 
the cross-cutting principles established in Art.
6.1:
•	 Use of the cooperation mechanisms is
to allow for raising climate action am­
bition, increasing the effort in terms of 
climate change mitigation or adapta­
tion.
•	 The mechanisms are to promote sus­
tainable development.  
•	 The mechanisms shall ensure envi­
ronmental integrity. 
Another cross-cutting issue is accounting and in
particular double counting. Art. 6.2 requires 
“robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the 
avoidance of double counting”, and Art. 6.5 
mandates that, “Emission reductions resulting 
from the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 
of this Article shall not be used to demonstrate 
achievement of the host Party's nationally de­
termined contribution if used by another Party 
to demonstrate achievement of its nationally 
determined contribution.”  
2.2 Raising Ambition 
Canada suggests that in order to raise ambi­
tions promptly the Parties should figure out 
how the accounting guidance could be de­
signed in a way that initiatives are enabled in 
the short term while leaving room for continu­
ing improvements in emissions inventories.
The African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the
EU and New Zealand discusses ambition in re­
lation to the concept of environmental integri­
ty, see below.
2.3 Sustainable Development 
The AGN posits that criteria for sustainable de­
velopment must be defined at national level
and that progress should be supervised at na­
tional level by a designated national authority.
At the international level, reporting should 
be on a voluntary basis, with reporting guide­
lines that do not establish undue burdens on 
developing countries. Further, they suggest 
that a tool like the CDM sustainable develop­
ment tool could as well be used voluntarily.
The submissions from the Arab Group and the 
Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs)
are nearly identical on this issue. They maintain
that the definition of sustainable development 
is a national prerogative. They nonetheless 
suggest that tools for sustainable development 
could be developed under Art. 6.8 and then be 
applied to the other parts of Art. 6. They high­
light in particular the relevance of potential 
negative impact of response measures.
Canada posits that it is the prerogative of Par­
ties to determine in which way cooperative ap­
proaches add to sustainable development.
Nevertheless, it suggests that reporting re­
quirements could include requirements for 
Parties using ITMOs to describe how the coop­
erative approach promotes sustainable devel­
opment.
The EU state that all approaches and activities 
in the context of the mechanisms under Art. 6 
should be in accordance with the Sustainable 
Development Goals. The Parties should report

























Update on Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
sustainable development. They suggest that a 
tool to assess the contribution of activities to 
the SDGs should be adopted, to define compa­
rable standards and indicators. Host Parties 
should in their view also confirm that activities 
are in conformity with their respective obliga­
tions on human rights. 
Thailand expresses that the determination of 
the sustainable development contribution from
cooperative approaches is a national preroga­
tive. Guidance should therefore respect nation­
al sovereignty and the fact that sustainable de­
velopment is defined by national processes.
Thailand nonetheless suggests that guiding 
principles should be developed in order to 
support parties in promoting sustainable de­
velopment. These principles should consider 
the following aspects:
•	 Contribution to environmental, social 
and economic aspects of development;
•	 Provision of adaption co-benefits, in­
cluding through a share of proceeds or 
other relevant approaches;
•	 Facilitation of technology development 
and transfer; 
•	 Promoting access to financial resources;
•	 Strengthening capacity of developing 
countries.
Furthermore, Parties which use ITMOs achiev­
ing their NDC should demonstrate in their re­
porting how they are supporting sustainable 
development in the host country.
Tuvalu suggests that all units traded under Ar­
ticles 6.2 and 6.4 would need to include a cer­
tificate indicating that the units traded or re­
ceived have not resulted in environmental 
harm and have not adversely affected any 
human rights. 
2.4 Environmental Integrity 
The AGN consider it imperative that coopera­
tive approaches result in an increase of ambi­
tion. Mitigation outcomes can in their view only 
be traded if the cooperation has resulted in a 
greater level of mitigation than would have oc­
curred in the absence of the cooperation. Fur­
thermore, it should be ensured that no perverse 
incentives are established. They suggest to ap­
ply the same standards to activities under Art.
6.2 as to activities under Art. 6.4 “if they are sim­
ilar in nature”. Parties involved must in their 
view demonstrate how they safeguard envi­
ronmental integrity and sustainable develop­
ment, this reporting would be subject to ex­
pert review, and Parties would only be 
allowed to use ITMOs towards their NDCs in 
case of positive expert reviews. 
The Arab Group and the LMDCs declare that 
the special character of Art. 6.2 lies not in the 
production of mitigation outcomes, which is al­
so addressed in other parts of Agreement, but 
rather in their transfer. For this reason, envi­
ronmental integrity should in their view be re­
lated to the transfer of mitigation outcomes
while the mitigation outcomes themselves 
are the prerogative of Parties. 
Canada suggests that environmental integrity 
in relation to market mechanisms means that 
the generation and use of ITMOs must reduce 
overall global emissions. In their view it is 
therefore necessary to:
•	 Provide confidence in the integrity of
ITMOs; 
•	 Require robust tracking, reporting and 
accounting of ITMOs;
•	 Not undermine the integrity of NDC 
achievement. 
The EU posits that ensuring environmental in­
tegrity reflects the more general principles es­
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Article 3 (on progression over time) and by Arti­
cle 4 (on NDCs and accounting). In order to en­
sure environmental integrity, it will be neces­
sary that the guidance under Article 6(2) ‘allows 
for higher ambition’ (Article 6(1)), that each Par­
ty’s successive NDC ‘represent a progression’
and ‘reflect its highest possible ambition’ (Arti­
cle 4(3)), and that Parties ‘move over time to­
wards economy wide emission reductions’ (Ar­
ticle 4(4)). 
The EU suggests that additional rules may be 
needed to ensure that the use of ITMOs does 
not result in higher global GHG emissions
than if the NDCs were achieved only through 
domestic mitigation actions.
New Zealand believes that the possibility for 
Parties to share costs and opportunities will 
result in greater climate action than if they were 
limited to their domestic options. It also high­
lights that effective robust accounting is need­
ed to ensure environmental integrity. It goes 
into particular detail in its submission on Article 
6.4 and takes a position very similar to the EU’s.
New Zealand highlights that achievement of 
real, measurable and long-term benefits, addi­
tionality, verification and certification are key to 
environmental integrity. Moreover, it stipulates 
that the overall goals of the Paris Agreement
need to be taken into account. In their view,
long crediting periods or crediting against 
BAU are not compatible with the Agreement’s 
requirements for all Parties to make mitigation 
contributions and to demonstrate progression 
over time, alongside the goal of net zero global
emissions in the second half of this century.
New Zealand calls for this context to be reflect­
ed in the mechanism’s approach to additionali­
ty, baseline setting and crediting length. More­
over, the mechanism should not disincentivise 
progression in the ambition of NDCs nor 
broadening the scope of NDCs over time.
Since ITMOs should fulfil a universal standard,
Papua New Guinea (PNG) suggests introduc­
ing UNFCCC-ISO certificates for ITMOs. PNG 
suggests four steps which projects or mitiga­
tion activities that want to provide ITMOs 
should follow.
1)	 Submission of a registration request 
through the Designated National Focal
Point.
2)	 The focal point may subject the pro­
ject/s to a UNFCCC Environmental In­
tegrity Review process, which subjects 
the interested projects to the guidelines 
adopted by the CMA. Whether the pro­
ject meets the standards would be as­
sessed by specialised reviewers.
3)	 Projects which fulfil the required stand­
ards should have their units be com­
piled and registered in a national sys­
tem as ITMOs.
4)	 When the transfers of ITMOs are taking 
place, then the ITMO receives an ISO­
UNFCCC certified label.
Thailand wants to establish onlyminimum cri­
teria on environmental integrity. Guidance
should provide flexibility to respect special na­
tional circumstances and avoid undue burdens.
No discount or exchange rates or similar ap­
proaches should be introduced.
2.5 Accounting
2.5.1 General Accounting Issues 
According to the EU, robust accounting for ac­
tivities under Art. 6.2 requires that:
•	 the participating Parties have reported 
- information on the scope and quanti­
fication of their NDCs in tonnes of CO2 
equivalent,
- the information on the level of emis­
sions and removals for the relevant year 
or period,
- the accounting balance for the rele­

































sions and removals also covered by its 
NDC,
- the information on transfers and use 
of ITMOs by Party and by year, 
- other relevant information;
•	 the reported information is being re­
viewed prior to its recording;
•	 the reviewed information is being rec­
orded in a centralised accounting data­
base.
The EU encourages establishing a centralised
registry or system of registries which record 
the generation, transfer and use of ITMOs by 
Parties. It proposes to establish a centralised 
accounting database supervised by the Secre­
tariat and defined and elaborated in the guid­
ance. The purpose of a centralised accounting 
database would be to track progress and ac­
counting for NDCs. This would include:
•	 The information on the scope and NDC 
quantity in CO2 equivalent;
•	 The information on the Party’s current 
level of emissions and removals cov­
ered by its NDC;
•	 The accounting balance determined in
accordance with guidance on the basis 
of reported emissions and removals 
covered by each participating Party’s
NDC;
•	 The corresponding adjustments to the 
accounting balances of participating.
The EU as well states that accounting and 
transparency requirements need to be con­
sistent and hints at inter-linkages with Art. 4.13 
and Art. 13.7. Furthermore, further considera­
tions of timing and the scope of information 
under Art. 13.7 are needed.
Apart from this, the modalities and procedures 
of Art. 6.4 should reflect the inter-linkages with 
Art. 4.3 and Art. 4.4. Furthermore, there is a 
need for coherence with related items like the 
transparency framework and accounting rules 
Update on Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
under Art. 4.3. An additional inter-linkage exists 
with Art. 13.7.  
The EU considers the avoidance of double 
counting as a central element within the con­
text of environmental integrity. Suggested 
measures to avoid double counting are in their 
view: 
•	 The quantification of NDCs through the 
reporting process; 
•	 The quantification of an accounting 
balance based on actual emissions;
•	 The adjustment of the accounting bal­
ance in accordance with guidance on 
accounting and corresponding adjust­
ment provisions;
•	 A centralised review system subject to 
common rules (either through a single 
centralised registry, or multiple regis­
tries operating as a system). 
Japan clarifies that the credits/ units to quantify 
emission reduction should represent one met­
ric tonne of carbon dioxide. Japan encourages 
developing a common understanding of 
double counting and preventive measures.
Suggested categories are: 
•	 Double registration 
•	 Double issuance 
•	 Double usage 
•	 Double claiming 
Japan also suggests a template for reporting 
date on issuances, transfers and use of units 
under Article 6.
PNG wants to establish a common accounting 
framework that promotes environmental integ­
rity. To avoid double counting, the ISO-UNFCCC 
certified units could also be used in schemes 
related to ICAO and IMO. Only the names would 
differ. 
Thailand states that transfers and acquisition of 
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progresses. It points to the inter-linkages be­
tween Art. 6, 4 and 13. For that reason, guid­
ance on the matter of accounting should en­
sure consistency and avoid duplication and 
prejudice.
Tuvalu states that all traded units should re­
ceive a reference code and should be recorded 
in a national registry. All reference codes 
should be recorded under the Art. 6.2 registry.
They suggest that Parties would need to calcu­
late a “NDC Limitation Quotient” (NLQ), mean­
ing the total emissions reduction defined within
a Party’s nationally determined contribution 
relative to the reference year or base year and 
expressed as tonnes of carbon dioxide equiva­
lent. Units that are sold should be subtracted 
from the Party’s NLQ, whereas units that are 
bought should be added to the Party’s NLQ.
Tuvalu maintains that the participation in the 
trade of emissions requires a national desig­
nated authority to oversee the trade and the 
establishment of a national registry. The na­
tional designated authority should approve all
trading and authorise all entities engaged in
trading. The national registries should provide:
•	 Publicly accessible information; 
•	 A calculation of “the total emission re­
duction defined within a Party’s NDC”;
•	 A reserve of traded units;
•	 A description of entities that are eligible 
to trade in units. 
Apart from this, it should be subject to technical
assessments in accordance with Art. 13. The 
UNFCCC secretariat should maintain an inter­
national registry to record all transfers, which 
should be easily and publicly accessible.
2.5.2 Accounting for NDC Diversity 
The AGN maintains that all Parties to the Paris 
Agreement with all types of NDCs can engage 
in cooperative approaches.
The Arab Group and the LMDCs likewise stipu­
late that Article 6 should have an inclusive ap­
proach, accommodating all types of NDCs.
The EU stresses that different types of NDCs 
should result in different rules. 
Japan suggests three approaches to use emis­
sion reductions towards the achievement of 
NCDs with single-year targets. 
1)	 Cumulative: The emission reductions 
generated during the NDC period could 
be used for the achievement of the 
point-year target. 
2)	 Same vintage: The vintage year of emis­
sion reductions will be used for the 
achievement of the point-year target. 
3)	 Average: the emission reductions gen­
erated during the NDC period could be 
averaged by the NDC period and this 
averaged amount of emission reduc­
tions could be used for the achieve­
ment of the point year target.
Tuvalu states that units should be quantified in
terms of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent.
Only Parties to the Paris Agreement that have 
quantified their NDCs should be eligible to 
trade emissions under Article 6.2 and to host 
activities under Article 6.4.
2.5.3 Corresponding Adjustments 
The AGN suggests that “ITMOs should be add­
ed or subtracted from a Party’s NDC if emissions 
reductions are inside the transferring Party’s
NDC and be subject to reporting guidelines un­
der Art. 13 and additional guidance from Art.
6.2.” Corresponding adjustments would not 
apply if emission reductions are outside the 
scope of the transferring country’s NDC, or if
units are cancelled instead of being used for 
NDC compliance. In their view, the main rea­
son why a sector is not included in an NDC is 
usually lack of quality data. Instead of penalis­






















Update on Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
be used to improve data availability and there­
by prepare integration in future NDCs. 
If a transfer of mitigation outcomes does not 
require corresponding adjustments, the Parties 
should nevertheless report on internationally
transferred units in their biennial communica­
tions. To ensure that corresponding adjust­
ments are equal, Parties that are involved in a 
bilateral scheme should agree on the amount 
of ITMOs each of them reports. 
Brazil states that corresponding adjustment 
is only applicable in the context of Art. 6.2 
and in the case of one Party transferring its 
acquired Art. 6.4 units to another Party. By
contrast, a corresponding adjustment is in their 
view not applicable to the initial forwarding
from the Art. 6.4 registry to the 6.2 multilateral 
registry. In their view, establishing correspond­
ing adjustments at the initial transfer is not pos­
sible and even harmful because of three as­
pects:
•	 First, corresponding adjustment in the 
context of Art. 6.4 would infringe the 
legal text of the Paris Agreement as cor­
responding adjustments are mentioned 
only in relation to the guidance under 
Article 6.2 but not in relation to Article 
6.4. Moreover, a corresponding adjust­
ment at the initial forwarding would in
their view violate the provision of Arti­
cle 6.4(c) according to which the host 
Party is to benefit from emission reduc­
tions.
•	 Second, Brazil has technical objections.
The CERs would be located in the Art.
6.4  registry and not in national ac­
counts. Therefore, Brazil considers it as 
illogical to subtract units from the na­
tional account of the host Party if it did 
not participate in the first transaction. 
Moreover, the host Party’s ability to
reach its NDC would be restricted,
which would constitute a disincentive 
for countries to allow mitigation activi­
ties within their territories.  
•	 Third, Brazil sees no danger of double
counting within Art. 6.4 because it is
prevented by Art. 6.5. In their view there 
also is no danger of double claiming 
due to different calculation procedures:
The IPCC Guidelines for National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories for actual
emission levels relating to the NDC ver­
sus counterfactual estimations ap­
proved by the Executive Board for 
SDM/CDM mitigation.
Moreover, according to Brazil the concept of 
additionality leads to irrelevance of the ques­
tion whether the SDM activity is within the 
scope of the NDC or not, as additionality re­
quires that reductions go beyond what would 
be achieved through the NDC. Thus, in neither 
case a corresponding adjustment is required.
Canada suggests that corresponding adjust­
ments are comparable to double-entry 
bookkeeping. This means that appropriate re­
porting instruments should make clear that 
both Parties that are relevant for the corre­
sponding adjustment are included in the ac­
counting for NDCs of all Parties.
Canada suggests that further discussions on 
cases where ITMOs are generated outside the 
scope of a Party’s NDC are not an immediate 
priority and should be left for the future.
According to the EU, ITMOs and emission re­
ductions resulting from mechanisms under Art 
6.4 should be subject to corresponding ad­
justment.   
Japan stipulates that the Art. 6.2 guidance 
should ensure incentives for Parties to in­
crease the coverage of sectors under their 
NDCs. Therefore, irrespective of whether credits 
are transferred or generated inside or outside a 
Party’s NDC coverage, they should in both cases 
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Japan also states that emission reductions re­
sulting from Art. 6.4 should be subject to corre­
sponding adjustment in line with the guidance 
of Art. 6.2. The emission reductions should be 
reported in the registry of the Art. 6.4 mecha­
nisms.  
New Zealand includes proposed elements for 
the 6.2 guidance in its submission. They sug­
gest that Parties shall provide ITMO account­
ing tables in a standard electronic format.
Corresponding adjustments shall be made by 
subtracting from/adding to “inventory total” 
emissions of the relevant NDC year,
Thailand posits that simplicity should be main­
tained in how the corresponding adjustment is
performed and that the national determination 




















On Art. 6.2, two sets of issues receive most at­
tention: the scope of cooperative approaches 
and the content of the guidance and govern­
ance. 
3.2 Scope of Cooperative Ap­
proaches 
The AGN explains that cooperative approaches 
can take “a variety of shapes”, for example 
linkage of emission trading schemes, operation 
of bilateral crediting mechanisms and other 
forms of government-to-government coopera­
tion. The AGN define ITMOs as “bookkeeping 
unit to keep track of the exchange of mitiga­
tion outcomes between two Parties”. They are 
the net balance of trades and relate to coop­
eration between two or more Parties that re­
sulted in mitigation outcomes. ITMOs do not 
constitute carbon credits or a type of commodi­
ty. “They are neither issued, nor can they be 
held, traded, cancelled or banked. Because of 
their bookkeeping nature, ITMOs cannot be 
used by private entities to fulfil commitments.” 
The submissions by the Arab Group and the 
Like-Minded Developing Countries are nearly 
identical on this issue. They interpret the Article 
6 mechanisms as bottom-up approaches that 
should be inclusive and consistent with na­
tional prerogatives. In their view, useful mitiga­
tion areas are mitigation co-benefits from adap­
tation actions as well as activities leading to 
emission avoidance. They emphasize that a full 
spectrum of mitigation opportunities in­
cludes various mitigation metrics like energy 
efficiency and renewable energy certificates, 
which would in their view need to be accom­
modated.
Canada understands cooperative approaches 
in the sense of using ITMOs towards NDCs and 
ITMOs as being quantified in terms of carbon 
dioxide equivalents (tCO2e).
Canada note that the Paris Agreement is a bot­
tom-up approach and accordingly “Article 6,
paragraph 2 is intended to create a flexible, 
evolving space that encourages the develop­
ment of new and innovative bottom-up ap­
proaches and experimentation with a variety of 
methods”, including participation of non-Party 
actors. 
The EU considers ITMOs to be amounts in CO2 
equivalents, intended for the use towards a Par­
ty’s NDC. An ITMO is used when a correspond­
ing adjustment is duly recorded in a centralised
accounting database.
New Zealand stipulates that Party to Party co­
operation may take place in a number of ways, 
including linked emissions trading schemes,
trading in emission reductions, Article 6.4 unit 
trading and government to government ar­
rangements.
PNG emphasizes that Art. 6.2 does not evaluate 
existing establishments but that cooperative 
approaches obviously constitute a market 
mechanism in order to trade with ITMOs. PNG
stresses that it is the sovereign prerogative of 
Parties to choose and determine which miti­
gation measure they wish to implement or 
use.
Thailand expresses the view that cooperative 
approaches should result in cost-effective miti­
gation actions and co-benefits like the promo­
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cooperative approaches as voluntary coopera­
tion between Parties to the Paris Agreement 
which is formalized through bilateral or multi­
lateral agreements. ITMOs should be quantified 
in terms of tCO2e and should include interna­
tionally transferred emission reductions from 
mechanisms under Art. 6.4 as well.
Tuvalu states that units should be quantified in
terms of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. In
their view, use of cooperative approaches 
should be limited to trading emission reduc­
tions that are in excess of a Party’s NDC. 
Units cannot be sold to other Parties after 
the first transaction, nor be traded in sec­
ondary markets.
3.3 Scope of the Guidance and 
Governance
According to the AGN, guidance should include 
accounting rules for ITMOs as well as rules 
underlying the generation of mitigation out­
comes if not covered by Art.6.4. Furthermore,
guidance under Art. 6.2 should include an ex­
pert review to which the Parties’ reports are 
subjected. The guidance should define how dif­
ferent types of NDCs are dealt with in the con­
text of accounting and transferring mitigation 
outcomes. The governance should include a 
technical check to ensure the similarity be­
tween the corresponding adjustments. The re­
port on ITMOs should happen at the time of ex­
change, it should be subject to conforming 
rules and the modalities and guidelines under 
Art. 6.2 and related robust governance. The 
CMA should be the supreme body that over­
sees cooperative approaches. Once a year it
should decide about additional guidance build­
ing on experiences.
As noted above, the Arab Group and the 
LMDCs declare that the special character of Art. 
6.2 is not the production of mitigation out­
comes but rather their transfer. The guidance 
should therefore focus on the transfer of mit­
igation outcomes while the mitigation out­
comes themselves are the prerogative of 
Parties. 
Brazil posits that the guidance should provide 
rules and infrastructure for generating, transfer­
ring and accounting tradable units. Brazil sug­
gests that the guidance constitutes an addi­
tional layer for the implementation of 
transparency commitments under Art. 13 and 
for NDC accounting under Art. 4.13. Brazil also 
suggests a table of contents, covering participa­
tion requirements, national systems, registries 
and international transaction log, quantification 
of NDC permitted emissions and issuance of 
NDC permitted emission units, limitations on 
trading, transfers, reporting and accounting.  
Canada posits that guidance under Art. 6.2 re­
lates to robust accounting to avoid double
counting and at the same time to promoting 
sustainable development, environmental integ­
rity and transparency. In its view this account­
ing guidance should be consistent with the 
general accounting rules under Art. 4, but 
should relate to special risks of double count­
ing when using ITMOs. The guidance under 
Art. 6.2 should show how to produce figures for 
the “net inflow/outflow of ITMOs trans­
ferred/used”. These figures would be used in
the general accounting framework, which 
should include an account of all ITMOs trans­
ferred to and from the Parties plus a reference 
to all ITMOs applied towards the Party’s NDC in
the applicable years. 
The EU states that the guidance under Art. 6.2 
should be inclusive, applying to all Parties
which participate in cooperative approaches 
and use ITMOs to reach their NDCs. The report­
ing and review requirements should be coordi­
nated with the guidance under Art. 13 and Art.
4.3.
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•	 The Parties that should indicate their 
approval under Art. 6.3 and fulfil sub­
stantive and reporting requirements; 
•	 a centralised accounting database;
•	 the reporting and review system to be 
elaborated under Art. 13;
•	 the facilitative compliance system to be
elaborated under Art. 15.
The EU suggests that the guidance should in­
clude reporting obligations in respect of: 
•	 authorisation of use of ITMOs by Parties 
as specified under Art. 6.3;
•	 information on the cooperative ar­
rangement in respect of which ITMOs 
are transferred;
•	 reporting for the purpose of robust ac­
counting;
•	 reporting for the purpose of ensuring 
environmental integrity and promoting 
sustainable development.
Japan reiterates its position that it is the pre­
rogative of Parties to generate, transfer and 
use credits/units. They therefore suggest that 
the guidance referred to in Art. 6.2 should be 
limited to the accounting of the progress of 
NDCs to ensure transparency. Nonetheless, Par­
ties should be encouraged to report on the 
promotion of sustainable development and en­
suring environmental integrity via the transpar­
ency framework under Art. 13. Japan suggests 
that the format and reporting procedure should 
be established in accordance with the transpar­
ency framework under Art. 13.
New Zealand notes that there is no mandate 
to develop rules or recommendations for a 
supervising body for Article 6.2. The guidance 
should in their view focus on robust accounting 
but they express acceptance on the issue that 
Parties need guidance on other matters, too.
New Zealand states that governance by the Par­
ties should be performed by a robust and 
 
transparent system of reporting, review and 
multilateral consideration. Similar to Japan,
New Zealand suggests that governance 
should be exercised through the transparen­
cy framework. This means:
a)	 The CMA overseeing the provision of in­
formation; 
b)	 Technical review of Parties’ reporting 
on use of cooperative approaches;
c)	 Parties exercising the opportunity to 
ask questions about Parties’ use of co­
operative approaches through the mul­
tilateral consideration process;
d)	 The CMA receiving the annual report of 
the Art. 15 Committee. 
In their view, Parties must provide information
on the requirements of Article 6.1 in their bien­
nial communications. New Zealand therefore 
calls for the development of reporting guide­
lines in addition to the accounting guidance.
Reports on robust accounting should include 
ITMO accounting tables.
PNG considers existing governance structures 
that guide the role of market mechanisms such 
as the governance structure of the CDM as use­
ful. Again, PNG states the reporting should 
happen in accordance with the transparency 
framework under Art. 13. Apart from that PNG 
suggest that the guidance developed in the 
context of Art. 6.2 could also be established un­
der Art. 6.4. 
Since PNG considers the question whether 
there should be one global mechanism or ra­
ther a framework including regional and na­
tional schemes as still open, it makes clear that 
it does not favour one centralized oversight 
mechanism, instead it suggests:
a)	 The use of existing national ETS mecha­
nisms as long as the existing account­
ing rules used by the national ETS 
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new guidance developed by parties 
and approved by the CMA 
b)	 The use of existing regional ETS mech­
anisms as long as the existing account­
ing rules used by the national ETS 
mechanisms are compatible with any 
new guidance developed by parties 
and approved by the CMA.
c)	 The use of new and emerging ETS 
mechanisms with the same approach 
applied in (a) and (b) with regards to 
the guidance approved by the CMA. 
d)	 The development of new bilateral ETS­
type mechanisms if no existing ar­
rangements such as (a), (b) and (c) are in 
place to accommodate the choice from 
Parties who wishes to participate in any 
voluntary cooperative approaches.  
e)	 The development of issue-specific ETS­
type mechanisms if possible.  
Thailand suggests that the Art. 6.2 guidance 
should  
•	 Provide flexibility due to different na­
tional circumstances;
•	 Be respectful of national sovereignty;
•	 Avoid the creation of undue burdens 
especially on developing countries;
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4 Article 6.4 Mechanism
 
4.1 Overview 
Apart from cross-cutting issues as discussed in
chapter 2, the points raised in the submissions 
on the 6.4 mechanism particularly relate to the 
following issues: 
• Scope of the mechanism;
• Institutional Arrangements;
• Overall Mitigation; 
• Methodologies and accounting; 
• CDM transition issues.
4.2 Scope of the Mechanism
The AGN considers the purposes of the Art. 6.4 
mechanism to be enhancing ambition by ena­
bling additional mitigation action by public and 
private actors and to provide a “globally vetted 
framework for the certification of real, measur­
able and long-term benefits of mitigation ac­
tion as a result of global cooperation.” In con­
trast to the cooperative approaches it deals 
with the certification of individual activities. 
They argue that this mechanism is especially 
important for countries that are not able to de­
velop own approaches. In their view, the mech­
anism could include different classes of activi­
ties, rules for which could be developed at 
different speeds. The units generated under 
this mechanism could be used for different 
purposes either by Parties or by private sector 
actors. 
The Arab Group suggests that the modalities 
and procedure of the CDM as well as its reforms 
should constitute a basis for the modalities 
under Art. 6.4. The mechanism should be appli­
cable to all types of mitigation activities in all 
sectors. They in particular see opportunities to 
raise adaptation ambition by incorporating mit­
igation co-benefits of adaptation actions and 
economic diversification plans.
Brazil claims that based on the Paris Agree­
ment the scope of the new mechanism is simi­
lar to the scope of the CDM. Brazil envisages 
the new mechanism as the ultimate interna­
tional mechanism to certify climate action and 
issue credits. 
The EU suggests that the host Party should 
define the scope of activities covered by the 
mechanism and identify their proposed contri­
bution to the mitigation object. By that the 
mechanism would promote mitigation and the 
host party could benefit from credited activi­
ties. The EU emphasizes that the surplus (non­
credited) part of the emission reduction should 
remain with the host Party. In this context it 
states that only activities inside the scope of 
the NDC should be credited, keeping in mind 
that an NDC can be updated any time.
PNG considers that the implementation scope 
should allow flexibility for the host parties to 
decide in which jurisdictional implementation 
scope they wish to engage as long as it does 
not conflict with the principles of accounting 
and transparency under Art. 6.5.
New Zealand considers that the mechanism
should be designed to support various types 
of emission reductions with environmental in­
tegrity, like projects, programmes of activities 
and sectoral approaches. New Zealand states 
that since the full development of regulations 
for all types of activities is time-consuming
“staging the development” could be useful to 
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ties as soon as possible. The SBSTA should first 
focus its work on developing regulations that 
are generally applicable or related to project­
based activities. Other types of activities should
be developed secondary and with the expertise 
of the supervisory body.
Tuvalu states that the Art. 6.4 mechanism
should be applicable to actions within and 
outside a Party’s NDC. Nevertheless, different 
accounting rules are necessary for the different 
cases and Parties that act outside their NDC
should be encouraged to quantify their NDC.
Units cannot be sold to other Parties after the 
first transaction, nor be traded in secondary 
markets.
4.3 Institutional Arrangements 
The AGN argues that since the SDM is similar to 
the CDM, it should be orientated on process­
es, institutions, methodologies and experi­
ences from the CDM. The negotiations should 
focus on issues that differ from the CDM, which 
in their view relate to the scope of the mecha­
nism, governance, operationalization of overall
mitigation of global emissions and the relation­
ship between crediting and NDCs.
Brazil suggests that all certified emission re­
ductions units issued by the Executive Board 
should in the first instance be registered in a 
“SDM registry”. Units within this registry could 
be used by a Party towards its NDC or a non­
state stakeholder towards voluntary climate 
strategies. In the latter case, the units should be 
cancelled from the registry. In the case of a Par­
ty that acquires units, these units should be 
transferred to the Party’s national account with­
in the multilateral registry. The multilateral reg­
istry should follow the guidance under Art. 6.2.
The EU suggests that the governance of the 
mechanism should include the following issues:
•	 A supervisory body under the authority 
of the CMA;
•	 Parties using the mechanism on a vol­
untary basis;
•	 Parties authorising participation of pub­
lic and private entities;
•	 Designated operational entities verify­
ing and certifying emission reductions 
resulting from mitigation activities.
The supervisory body should have a strategic 
role and could be assisted by technical panels.
Modalities and procedures should ensure the 
transparency of decision-making processes at 
all levels, local stakeholder consultations, the 
right of directly affected entities to hearings 
prior to decision-making, that issues linked to
human rights are promptly referred to relevant 
UN bodies, and timely decisions. The modalities 
should reflect the Parties’ obligations concern­
ing human rights.
Japan demands that the membership of the 
supervising body should ensure a better repre­
sentation of all Parties. For that reason, the 
member selection should differ from that of the 
CDM within the Kyoto Protocol.
New Zealand similarly suggests that the Paris 
Committee on Capacity Building and the Article 
15 Committee should function as an ideal for 
membership within the supervisory body,
meaning two representatives from each UN re­
gional group, one from Small Island Developing 
States and one from Least Developed Coun­
tries. 
The supervisory body should be able to devel­
op its own rules of procedures. In general, the 
decision-making process should be a process of 
finding a consensus. If this fails, decisions 
should be made by supermajority. The func­
tions should include a publicly available and 
transparent database of all activities and a pub­
licly available and transparent register of all
emission reductions credited.
PNG considers a centralised oversight structure 




























Update on Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
sidered to introduce sub-set structures at the 
regional level in order to guarantee a smooth 
management the processes.
Tuvalu favours the establishment of a national
designated authority to oversee the govern­
ance of Art. 6.4 activities. Tuvalu also suggests 
the establishment of a Board to oversee the ap­
proval of mitigation activities and on that basis 
authorise the transfer of units. The Board 
should:
•	 maintain an international registry;
•	 establish verification and certification 
procedures for all activities; 
•	 ensure that a certificate is created 
which ensures environmental integrity 
and human rights;
•	 ensure that all activities under Art. 6.4 
are voluntary, real, measurable, have 
long term benefits, and are additional.
4.4 Overall Mitigation 
Brazil claims that the additionality require­
ment ensures that emissions are tackled at a 
level that goes beyond what would be achieved 
through the delivery of the host Party's and the 
acquiring Party's NDCs in aggregate. Corre­
sponding adjustments are therefore in their 
view not needed to achieve overall mitigation. 
The EU notes that the determination and as­
sessment of overall mitigation needs clarifica­
tion. They consider that this concept expresses 
support for the application of accounting 
rules, for provisions to ensure an own contri­
bution by the host Party, and for a potential 
net-benefit for the atmosphere. 
Japan suggests that to achieve overall mitiga­
tion, methodological approaches should be 
different from the CDM. Possible ways of im­
plementation are conservative reference lev­
els below business-as-usual (BaU) levels or high 
default values to calculate project emissions.
New Zealand suggests to define overall mitiga­
tion as emission reductions achieved by an 
activity exceeding the emission reductions 
actually credited to the activity. To achieve 
this aim, conservative baselines or reference 
levels are useful.  
4.5 Methodologies on crediting, 
additionally and Baselines 
Brazil explains that additionality refers to pro­
jects that are only possible due to the 6.4 
mechanism. It warns that some activities might
loose their status as being additional in the 
course of the progressive implementations of
the Paris Agreement.  
Brazil suggests that current CDM methodolo­
gies should also be applicable to the SDM.
The EU suggests several principles relating to 
the crediting of activities:
•	 The scope and nature of the activities 
covered must be defined by the host 
party.
•	 The baseline approaches should be 
based on ambitious benchmarks re­
flecting best available technologies 
(BAT) and enable the host Party to con­
tribute to its mitigation objectives while
also allowing the emission reduction 
credited to be used by another Party to 
fulfil its NDC. Baseline approaches de­
rived from historic or projected emis­
sions could in their view undermine a 
host Party’s ability to meet its own NDC, 
by generating an expectation of credit­
ing levels inconsistent with that Party’s
NDC and overall mitigation strategy.
•	 The crediting approaches should en­
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ductions and avoid technological lock 
in. 
•	 The crediting periods should also ena­
ble Parties to ensure alignment of cred­
iting periods with mitigation objectives,
in particular with the timescale of their 
NDC, in order to avoid disincentives to 
higher ambition or progression.
As noted in the section on environmental integ­
rity, New Zealand considers long crediting 
periods or crediting against BAU as inappro­
priate in the context of the Paris Agreement.
4.6 Transition from the CDM
According to the AGN it is necessary to discuss 
the transition of activities under the CDM to the 
SDM as a matter of urgency in order to use the 
mitigation potential of existing projects and to 
protect the credibility of international mecha­
nisms. An eligibility check should be estab­
lished to identify registered CDM activities that 
could be transformed without revalidation. The 
special circumstances of African countries 
should be taken into account.
The Arab Group claims that the transition 
should cover rules, methodologies, infra­
structure, accreditation and activities under 
the current CDM.
Brazil posits that the SDM will succeed the 
CDM and demands a smooth transition, which
is in their view especially important to keep par­
ticipants from the private sector motivated to 
engage in mitigation actions. For the process of 
transition the following aspects should be tak­
en into account:
•	 It should be possible to use CDM CERs 
towards NDCs; 
•	 CDM methodologies should still be val­
id in the context of the SDM;
•	 The issuance of SDM CERs for CDM reg­
istered projects;
•	 Migration of the CDM accreditation sys­
tem to the SDM.
The EU posits that the mechanisms established 
in the Kyoto Protocol should not continue after 
the second commitment period. It notes that 
there is no provision for transition within the 
Paris Agreement. Transition arrangements for 
ongoing mitigation activities resulting from the 
Kyoto Protocol mechanisms can be established 
only if core elements of the implementing rules 
under Art. 6.4 are agreed upon and function as 
a basis. All existing and ongoing activities 
should be re-assessed in order to be credited 
under Art. 6.4.
Similarly, Japan is not in favour of orientating 
the 6.4 mechanism on the CDM. Rather, Par­
ties should learn from existing mechanisms and 
approaches. Japan declares that this does not 
only includes mechanisms from the Kyoto Pro­
tocol but also other approaches under the Con­
vention. 
Also New Zealand expresses the view that de­
cision 1/CP.21 does not entail the transition of 
Kyoto Protocol activities. They identify several 
differences between Art 6.4 mechanism and JI 
and CDM:
•	 Under the Paris Agreement all Parties 
make mitigation contributions;
•	 Art. 4.3 requires progression and high­
est possible ambition contributions;
and 
•	 Art 4.4 encourages developing coun­
tries to move towards economy-wide 
emission reductions or limitation tar­
gets.
They nevertheless concede that the concern to 
transfer CDM projects is understandable and 
suggest that CDM activities could be adopted 
if they are reassessed. 
 
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PNG suggests beginning the process of estab­
lishing governance with considering and assist­
ing aspects of transition. Issues that contain 
forms of assistance for transition should be dis­
cussed and decided on and adopted by the 
CMA. As long as all Parties agree, PNG is open 
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5Non-Market Approaches
 
5.1 Definition and elements of 
possible non-market ap­
proaches (NMAs) 
The EU suggests that NMAs are defined by their 
holistic, integrated and balanced non-market 
nature. As already stated within Art. 6.8 the EU 
notes that NMAs have three aims: promoting 
mitigation and adaptation ambition, en­
hancing public and private sector participa­
tion and enable opportunities for coordina­
tion across instruments and relevant 
institutional arrangements. According to the 
EU, NMAs should fulfil all three aims.
Possible further important features of NMAs are 
the non-tradable nature of the outcomes of 
NMAs, the request to avoid duplication of work 
and the recommendation of guidance on 
transparency and reporting when the Parties 
use a NMA under the framework.
PNG defines NMAs as approaches to promote 
mitigation and adaptation of more than one 
Party without the use of ITMOs but through 
financial support, technology transfers or 
capacity building within a cross-fora environ­
ment.  PNG proposes some examples of non­
market approaches:
•	 Payment for Eco-System Services (PES) 
•	 International Economic Diversification 
Options in the Fossil Fuel Industry. Par­
ties whose economy is dependent on 
the fossil fuel industry should be al­
lowed to implement economic diversi­
fication options in other Party’s territo­
ry. This could include investing in 
adaptation activities that promote miti­
gation co-benefits.
Further, PNG proposes non-market approaches 
to increase the role of non-party stakeholders 
beyond borders, such as: 
•	 Sister-city collaborations
•	 Bilateral and multilateral implementa­
tion platform for NAZCA members 
•	 Using international events (sports, cul­
tural activities, festivals) to launch emis­
sion reduction initiatives
•	 Designating high-profile persons such 
as politicians or celebrities as NDC am­
bassadors 
5.2 Framework for NMAs
The AGN express that the framework for NMAs 
should take into account linkages and syner­
gies between existing mechanisms without 
duplication and that it should provide funding 
for developing countries’ NDCs. NMAs are de­
fined as approaches that do not relate to trad­
ing activities.
Topics that should be considered in the further 
negotiations are:
•	 Clarification on the function of the 
framework; 
•	 Typology of activities should be de­
fined;
•	 Policies, strategies, projects and pro­
grammes that do not result in tradable 
units/ITMOS; 
•	 Process for identifying linkages and 
synergies across existing UNFCCC in­
struments and institutions and identifi­
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•	 Avoidance of duplication concerning fi­
nance, technology, capacity building 
support;
•	 Importance of adaptation activities with 
mitigation co-benefits and high sus­
tainable development impacts should 
be stressed; 
•	 How should non-state actors be in­
volved within the framework? 
The AGN also states that an entity that is coor­
dinating and overseeing the progress of the 
framework’s work programme and a tracking 
and/or reporting mechanism is necessary. 
According to the EU, the work programme on 
accomplishing the function of the framework 
referred to in Art. 6.9 should follow five steps: 
1) Identify relevant existing non-market instru­
ments;
2) Identify existing linkages, synergies, coordi­
nation and implementation;
3) Identify opportunities for the enhancement 
of existing linkages, creation of synergies, coor­
dination and implementation of NMAs;
4) Assess the results of the previous steps and 
draw conclusions on how to enhance existing 
linkages and create synergies; 
5) Proceed to the practical enhancement of 
linkages and creation of synergies through 
some relevant governance of the framework for 
non-market approaches while avoiding dupli­
cation.
The LMDCs demand a work program under the 
framework to identify and enhance linkages 
and create synergies between mitigation, adap­
tation, finance, technology transfer and capaci­
ty-building and to facilitate the implementation
and coordination of NMAs. Key issues are in 
their view:
•	 Development of instruments to facili­
tate cooperation between Parties; 
•	 Development of guidance for incorpo­
rating NMAs in the cooperation of Par­
ties; 
•	 Development of a registry of needs for 
the implementation of NDCs through 
NMAs, complemented by a facility to 
match needs and means of implemen­
tation; 
•	 Establishment of institutional arrange­
ments to allow the articulation of NMAs; 
•	 Establishment of an information­
sharing process for the development 
and implementation of NMAs, including
best practices and lessons learned.
New Zealand suggests that the aims of the 
work programme to enhance linkages and syn­
ergies would best be served by regular meet­
ings with experts and stakeholders to share in­
formation, best practices and lessons learned.
To this end, they propose to relocate the 
Technical Examination Process (TEP) and 
Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs) into the 
Article 6.8 work programme. They argue that 
the TEP and TEMs are established processes for 
considering policy approaches that fit well with 
the purposes of Article 6.8. In this way, Parties 
could cooperate on ambition, maintain an exist­
ing space where ideas and relationships are 
built, and expert advice is made available to all 
Parties. 
PNG expresses the view that the framework 
functions as an alternative to the market mech­
anisms within Art. 6. PNG identifies four fea­
tures of a framework for NMAs:
1.	 Participation by more than one party; 
2.	 Non-market measures under Art. 6.8 in­
cluding the involvement of Non-Party 
stakeholders;
3.	 ITMOs are not involved;
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PNG suggests that there is no need of creating 
a new body that operationalizes NMAs. In­
stead, elements under Art. 6.8 and Art. 6.9 could 
be integrated into the work program of exist­
ing operational committees, such as the Ad­
aptation Committee or the Standing Commit­
tee on Finance. PNG suggests that the TOR 
regarding programme priorities of existing 
committees should be expanded to include 
implementation of Art. 6.8. This would allow ex­
isting committees to streamline implementa­
tion while avoiding duplication of work. 
Tuvalu argues that NMAs should not be quanti­
fied by units and should encourage interna­
tional cooperation. They should be nationally
determined, which means that the governance 
structure lies within a Party’s responsibility. 
The Parties should try to provide best practices 
and case studies of NMAs and the Secretariat 
should maintain a clearing house of NMAs to 
identify opportunities of cooperation. They 
suggest to encourage all Parties to develop a 
work programme on NMAs and to include the­
se in their biennial reports, as appropriate.
Uganda envisages that the NMA Framework 
will help Parties to transparently account and 
credibly transfer financial support for mitiga­
tion, adaptation, technology transfer and ca­
pacity-building actions. They assert that the 
framework should be dynamic and flexible to 
cover a range of mechanisms and new ele­
ments like the promotion of mitigation and ad­
aptation ambition, the enhancement of public
and private sector participation in the imple­
mentation of NDCs and the enablement of op­
portunities for coordination across instruments 
and relevant institutional arrangements. The 
framework should promote non-transferrable 
and/or non-tradable outcomes without the 
commoditization of outputs. The Framework 
should be under the guidance and authority of 
the CMA.
They reiterate their demand to establish an Ad­
aptation Benefit Mechanism (ABM) as a com­
ponent of the framework for NMAs. The ABM 
would quantify adaptation benefits according 
to approved methodologies which Parties and 
private sector  actors could use to demonstrate 















Update on Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
6Synopsis
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes 
three approaches for countries to cooperate 
with each other: cooperative approaches under 
Art. 6.2, a new mechanism to promote mitiga­
tion and sustainable development under Art.
6.4, and a framework for non-market approach­
es under Art. 6.8. Detailed rules for these three 
approaches are currently being negotiated.
This paper summarised the views submitted by 
Parties in October 2017 to identify points of 
controversy and convergence.
Raising Ambition and Promoting Environ­
mental Integrity 
While the Paris Agreement mandates that Art. 6 
should contribute to increasing climate ambi­
tion and promote environmental integrity,
many submissions do not discuss these issues 
in detail. Those that do exhibit a wide diver­
gence of views, with calls for ambitious action 
on the one hand and calls to have only mini­
mum requirements on the other.
The African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the EU 
and New Zealand put it into the context of en­
vironmental integrity.  
The AGN considers it imperative that coopera­
tive approaches result in an increase of ambi­
tion. Mitigation outcomes can in their view only 
be traded if the cooperation has resulted in a 
greater level of mitigation than would have oc­
curred in the absence of the cooperation. Par­
ties involved must in their view demonstrate 
how they safeguard environmental integrity 
and sustainable development; this reporting 
would be subject to expert review, and Parties 
would only be allowed to use ITMOs towards 
their NDCs in case of positive expert reviews.  
Canada similarly suggests that environmental 
integrity means that the generation and use of 
ITMOs must reduce overall global emissions.
The EU and New Zealand posit that environ­
mental integrity needs to be related to the 
Agreement’s more general principles, in partic­
ular the long-term goal, the progression of 
NDCs over time, and the requirements that 
NDCs should reflect the highest possible ambi­
tion and move over time towards economy­
wide emission reductions. New Zealand further 
specifies that long crediting periods or credit­
ing against BAU are not compatible with the 
Agreement’s requirements. 
The Arab Group and the LMDCs have a diamet­
rically opposite position. They declare that the 
special character of Art. 6.2 lies not in the pro­
duction of mitigation outcomes, which is also 
addressed in other parts of the Agreement, but 
rather in their transfer. For this reason, envi­
ronmental integrity should in their view be re­
lated to the transfer of mitigation outcomes 
while the mitigation outcomes themselves are 
the prerogative of Parties.
Thailand similarly wants to establish only mini­
mum criteria on environmental integrity. No
discount or exchange rates or similar ap­
proaches should be introduced.
Promoting Sustainable Development 
The submissions that are so far available seem
to indicate that the controversy on whether or 
not to have international provisions on sustain­
able development may be over. Most submis­
sions that discuss sustainable development 
agree that the definition of sustainable devel­
opment and the determination whether activi­
ties contribute to sustainable development is a 
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submissions suggest that Parties should be re­
quired to report on how their use of Article 6 is
promoting sustainable development. The EU is
the most specific on this issue, suggesting 
comparable reporting on the basis of the Sus­
tainable Development Goals. A number of 
submissions also suggest that an international
tool like the CDM sustainable development tool 
could be helpful to assess activities in a compa­
rable manner, with use on a voluntary basis. 
The EU and Tuvalu also discuss human rights in
this context. The EU suggests that host Parties 
should confirm that activities are in conformity 
with their respective obligations on human
rights, while Tuvalu proposes that all units trad­
ed under Articles 6.2 and 6.4 would need to in­
clude a certificate indicating that the units trad­
ed or received have not resulted in 
environmental harm and have not adversely af­
fected any human rights. 
Accounting Emissions
Many submissions call for regular ongoing re­
porting and accounting to take place in the 
context of the broader accounting under Article 
4.13 and the transparency framework under Ar­
ticle 13. 
Most submissions maintain that Article 6 should 
have an inclusive approach, allowing participa­
tion of all countries irrespective of the types of 
their NDCs. However, Tuvalu posits that only 
Parties to the Paris Agreement that have quan­
tified their NDCs should be eligible to trade 
emissions under Article 6.2 and to host activi­
ties under Article 6.4. 
There is controversy on whether there is a need 
for corresponding adjustments if mitigation ac­
tions take place outside the host country’s NDC 
boundary. Japan stipulates that the Art. 6.2 
guidance should ensure incentives for Parties to 
increase the coverage of sectors under their 
NDCs. They therefore suggest that irrespective 
of whether credits are transferred or generated 
inside or outside a Party’s NDC coverage, they 
should in both cases be added to its emissions 
or deducted from its removals. By contrast, the 
AGN holds that corresponding adjustments 
would not apply if emission reductions are out­
side the scope of the transferring country’s
NDC, or if units are cancelled instead of being 
used for NDC compliance. In their view, the 
main reason why a sector is not included in an 
NDC is usually lack of quality data. Instead of
penalising such sectors, Article 6 should in their 
view be used to improve data availability and 
thereby prepare integration in future NDCs. 
Brazil continues to maintain the view that cor­
responding adjustment is only applicable in the 
context of Art. 6.2 and in the case of one Party 
transferring acquired Art. 6.4 units to another 
Party, but not to the initial forwarding from the 
Art. 6.4 registry to the 6.2 multilateral registry.  
Scope and Governance of Cooperative Ap­
proaches 
Consensus on what cooperative approaches are 
continues to be elusive. Many submissions hold 
that cooperative approaches should include 
any kind of cooperation between two or more 
countries. By contrast, Brazil’s submission is not 
explicit on the issue, but the table of contents it
proposes for the Art. 6.2 guidance suggests that 
it continues to see Art. 6.2 as analogous to Art.
17 of the Kyoto Protocol. The AGN similarly 
suggests that cooperation could take many 
shapes, but ITMOs are in their view a bookkeep­
ing unit reflecting the net balance of trades and 
do not constitute carbon credits or a type of 
commodity. They posit that ITMOs are neither 
issued, nor can they be held, traded, cancelled,
banked, or be used by private entities to fulfil
commitments. Tuvalu similarly holds that use of 
cooperative approaches should be limited to 
trading emission reductions that are in excess 
of a Party’s NDC. Units can in their view not be 
sold to other Parties after the first transaction, 
nor be traded in secondary markets.
Most of the submissions that are available so far 














What Types of Activities under the Art. 6.4 
Mechanism?
In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris 
Agreement does not specify that the new “sus­
tainable development mechanism” is about 
“projects”, raising the question of the level of 
aggregation of activities (projects, programmes 
and/or sectors). Most submissions suggest that 
the new mechanism should include all types of 
mitigation activities at all scales. By contrast, 
Brazil continues to maintain the view that the 
new mechanism should be similar to the CDM.
The AGN and New Zealand suggest staging the 
development of regulations for different types 
of activities. New Zealand proposes starting 
with project-based activities based on existing 
experience and then moving to other types.
Overall Mitigation of Global Emissions 
While the Paris Agreement foresees that the 
new mechanism shall contribute to an overall 
mitigation of global emissions, only a few sub­
missions discuss how to operationalise this ob­
jective. New Zealand notes that a definition of 
overall mitigation is so far lacking and suggests 
it should mean that not all the mitigation out­
comes achieved by an activity are credited to 
the activity.
The EU, Japan and New Zealand consider that 
the concept needs to be reflected in accounting 
rules and methodologies, with Japan and New 
Zealand suggesting conservative baselines. By 
contrast, Brazil claims that the additionality re­
quirement ensures that emissions are tackled at 
a level that goes beyond what would be 
achieved through the delivery of the host Par-
ty's and the acquiring Party's NDCs in aggre­
gate.
Transition from the CDM 
There is a controversy on whether to prioritise 
discussions on transition from the CDM. In par­
ticular the AGN and Brazil see this as a matter of 
urgency in order not to waste the mitigation 
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potential of existing projects and to protect the 
credibility of international mechanisms. The Ar-
ab Group and Brazil also call for the transposi­
tion of rules, methodologies, infrastructure and 
accreditation. 
By contrast, the EU, Japan and New Zealand are 
against easy transposition of regulations and 
activities. The EU and New Zealand maintain 
that CDM activities would need to be re­
assessed against the new mechanisms regula­
tions prior to adoption into the mechanism. 
Non-Market Approaches 
The submissions on non-market approaches do 
not indicate substantial conceptual advances.
The Like-Minded Developing Countries reiter­
ate their suggestion that the framework should 
facilitate access to finance, technology transfer, 
and capacity building for mitigation and adap­
tation, and contributing to map and register 
needs of countries and assisting them in match­
ing them with means of implementation.
Other countries reiterate their concern to avoid 
duplication of work with other processes under 
the UNFCCC. They suggest to focus discussions 
on possible synergies and coordination in non­
market cooperation.
New Zealand suggests a novel idea for how to 
move forward. They propose to relocate the 
Technical Examination Process (TEP) and Tech­
nical Expert Meetings (TEMs) into the Article 6.8 
work programme. They argue that the TEP and 
TEMs are established processes for considering 
policy approaches that fit well with the purpos­
es of Article 6.8. In this way, Parties could coop­
erate on ambition, maintain an existing space 
where ideas and relationships are built, and ex­
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